How do hardware standards protect the aerospace sector?

Over the past decade, space-based systems have undeniably become a cornerstone of modern connectivity, having evolved into an indispensable layer of digital communications across a multitude of sectors.

Satellite use cases, for example, now range from powering global navigation for train signalling, high-precision timing signals for global financial transactions, and tracking remote mining camps. This increased reliance on satellites as a core infrastructure utility resulted in a record 4,434 satellites launched into orbit in 2025 – a 65% increase on the previous year – highlighting how rapidly space-based systems have become integral to daily operations.

However, the status of these systems as global critical infrastructure makes them an ever-tempting target for malicious actors looking to access the key functions of satellite, space, and aero equipment. The recent OPS-SAT experiment – where a developer successfully hacked a European Space Agency (ESA) flight computer to run the video game Doom – shows how accessible on-orbit systems are becoming to attackers. While a humorous example, it demonstrates that for operators, securing and trusting aerospace component and networks is imperative.

What cyberthreats do aerospace systems face?

Aerospace systems face several key attack vectors and entry points ranging from the ground segment, command and control, supply chain, and on-orbit. The threats to these systems ranges from jamming and spoofing to malware injection and data interception; all of which can be significantly detrimental to the integrity of operations.

This is especially important now that risks aren’t confined to software alone. The growing debris environment and collision risks detailed by the Kessler Syndrome shows how physical disruption in orbit can escalate into system-wide operational failure.

Also – as equipment is difficult to directly hack in orbit – most attacks start on Earth at the ground segment. Attackers target network operations centers to essentially access the keys to the whole kingdom, going on to hunt for specific high value assets such as cryptographic management keys used to sign commands. Once acquired, they can send unauthorized commands to components or push malicious software to onboard computers to disable essential functions and send it into disarray.

Long before launch, there’s also the possibility that hardware and firmware has been tampered, either during assembly or transit via physical access. Last year, the ‘SpyChain’ case study, using NASA’s NOS3 satellite simulation, investigated supply chain attacks against small satellites, demonstrating that malicious functionality through the supply chain could persist onboard, evade testing, and disrupt operations. Such intrusions can be incredibly difficult to trace, and if a supply chain flaw is activated, equipment can be permanently compromised or lost.

Initiatives like Hack‑A‑Sat are exposing real satellite systems to controlled offensive testing, underlining the sector’s growing commitment to hardening space assets against compromise. However, to ensure aerospace equipment remains in its trusted state for its whole lifecycle and cannot be accessed, hardware Roots‑of‑Trust (RoT) and standards must be utilized from the initial manufacturing and implementation stage.

How do hardware roots-of-trust protect the aerospace sector?

A foundational hardware or software security component that is inherently trusted to always behave as expected, RoTs protect the aerospace sector by guaranteeing any aerospace system is operationally safe and trusted from instant application.

Trusted Computing Group (TCG) leads the development of these open standards for a range of use cases across the aerospace sector. For example, a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) provides a tamper resistant foundation in ground segment servers and mission control centers. When attackers try to steal the encryption keys used to sign satellite commands, a TPM creates and stores these critical cryptographic keys in its physical, tamper-resistant layer. Even if an attacker completely infects the server with malware, they cannot copy or download the signing keys to their own machine when a TPM is present.

CyRes also helps satellite operators maintain a trusted state by giving them a structured, evidence‑driven way to ensure stability. This technology formalizes the ‘protection, detection, recovery’ resilience process as hardware‑anchored building blocks that work even in disconnected in‑orbit environments.

In parallel, Remote Attestation allows a ground station to further verify the exact state of a satellite’s hardware before sending any high-risk operational commands. It solves a fundamental security problem: if an attacker has already compromised a satellite’s onboard computer, standard authentication may prevail, but remote attestation forces the satellite to prove it is still running clean code.

Reference Integrity Manifest (RIM) and Platform Requirements for Certificates and RIMs (PRCR) further help verify component provenance and ensure only trusted tools and consoles can interface with operational systems. Both standards assert exact security properties, cryptographic identities, and physical motherboard/chip layout of the platform as it was shipped.

Using these standards as the foundation, TCG is also actively helping operators apply trusted computing principles to strengthen the resilience of these systems through the new Aerospace and Non-Terrestrial Systems Solutions Working Group (AERO-SWG).

What is AERO-SWG?

AERO-SWG is a new Work Group in TCG focused on applying trusted computing principles to satellite networks, unmanned systems, autonomous platforms, and disconnected edge environments to bolster the integrity of the systems now at the focal point of global critical infrastructure.

Despite many TCG technologies already being used across the aerospace sector, the Work Group will explore how layered hardware and firmware security can be applied to more use cases across aircraft, satellites, and ground stations to strengthen trust at the platform level. This will be achieved through practical guidance, gap analysis, and recommendations to existing TCG Work Groups.

TCG is currently inviting industry experts to contribute to AERO-SWG. Chaired by Thorsten Stremlau – a recognized voice in the sector following his work at industry events such as SATShow, CyberSat, and the GSOA webinar series – we look forward to seeing how TCG technologies can be consolidated in an industry that needs trust more than ever.

For more information on becoming a member and participating in the group, visit here.